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Wednesday, February 2, 2011

The Federalist Papers, No. 60: Concerning The Power Of Congress To Regulate The Election Of Members (Cont'd.)

From Human Events--Guns & Patriots:

The Federalist No. 60


by The Federalist Papers



02/01/2011







Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of Members (continued)



Independent Journal

Saturday, February 23, 1788







To the People of the State of New York:



WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others, by confining the places of election to particular districts, and rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form altogether different and far more decisive.



The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred from this single reflection, that it could never be made without causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether inconceivable and incredible.



In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose the national government, and Õstill more in the manner in which they will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property, in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter, will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors.



As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power in question is placed -- whether in their hands or in those of the Union.



But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination between the different departments of industry, or between the different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of "the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement of all the rest of the society?



If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than from the latter.



The several States are in various degrees addicted to agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed into the national representation; and for the very reason, that this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.



In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land, where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition at least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this quarter as from the other.



In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would, in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed to investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale, must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce, in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor, by the urgent calls of public necessity.



I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born." These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the representative body; at another time it is to be effected by depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their right of suffrage in the choice of that body.



But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated preference? Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,1) is it not evident that the policy of confining the places of election to particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, the manner of elections. The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by the legislature.



Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers, still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade the essential rights of the community, and with the means of gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them, might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their authors? Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge the violated majesty of the people?



PUBLIUS

The Constitutional Moment

From The Wall Street Journal and ADF:

The Constitutional Moment


Judge Vinson introduces ObamaCare to Madison and Marshall..Article Video Comments (405) more in Opinion ».EmailPrintSave This ↓ More.

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close Yahoo! BuzzMySpacedel.icio.usRedditFacebookLinkedInFarkViadeoOrkut Text 'If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."



Federal Judge Roger Vinson opens his decision declaring ObamaCare unconstitutional with that citation from Federalist No. 51, written by James Madison in 1788. His exhaustive and erudite opinion is an important moment for American liberty, and yesterday may well stand as the moment the political branches were obliged to return to the government of limited and enumerated powers that the framers envisioned.



As Judge Vinson took pains to emphasize, the case is not really about health care at all, or the wisdom—we would argue the destructiveness—of the newest entitlement. Rather, the Florida case goes to the core of the architecture of the American system, and whether there are any remaining limits on federal control. Judge Vinson's 78-page ruling in favor of 26 states and the National Federation of Independent Business, among others, is by far the best legal vindication to date of Constitutional principles that form the outer boundaries of federal power.



At the heart of the states' lawsuit is the individual mandate, which requires everyone to purchase health insurance or be penalized for not doing so. "Never before has Congress required that everyone buy a product from a private company (essentially for life) just for being alive and residing in the United States," Judge Vinson writes.



Rep. Marsha Blackburn on the health-care ruling.

.Congressional Democrats and the Obama Administration justified this coercion under the Commerce Clause, so it is fitting that Judge Vinson conducts a deep investigation into its history and intent, including Madison's notes at the Constitutional Convention and the jurisprudence of the fourth Chief Justice, John Marshall. The original purpose of the Commerce Clause was to eliminate the interstate trade barriers that prevailed under the Articles of Confederation—among the major national problems that gave rise to the Constitution.



The courts affirmed this limited and narrow understanding until the New Deal, when Congress began to regulate harum-scarum and the Supreme Court inflated the clause into a general license for anything a majority happened to favor.



In a major 1942 case, Wickard v. Filburn, the Court held that even growing wheat for personal use was an activity with a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce, thus justifying federal restrictions on the use of agricultural land meant to prop up commodity prices. It wasn't until the William Rehnquist Court, a half-century later, that the Justices began to recover some of the original limits, notably in the Lopez (1995) and Morrison (2000) cases.



Yet even in its most elastic interpretations, the Commerce Clause applied only to "clear and inarguable activity," Judge Vinson writes, the emphasis his. It never applied to inactivity like not buying health insurance, which has "no impact whatsoever" on interstate commerce. He argues that breaching this frontier converts the clause into a general police power of the kind that the Constitution reserves to the states. As the High Court put it in Lopez, obliterating this distinction would "create a completely centralized government."



The Administration contends that not purchasing insurance—inactivity—is really activity, because everyone will eventually need medical care and their costs will be transferred to the insured. But Judge Vinson dissects that as a "radical departure" from the Constitution and U.S. case law. It is "not hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted," he writes. "Surely this is not what the Founding Fathers could have intended."



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.He notes that no one can opt out of eating any more than they can from the medical system, so return to the Wickard example of wheat: "Congress could more directly raise too-low wheat prices merely by increasing demand through mandating that every adult purchase and consume wheat bread daily, rationalized on the grounds that because everyone must participate in the market for food, non-consumers of wheat bread adversely affect prices in the wheat market."



Unlike Judge Henry Hudson in Virginia, who also found ObamaCare to be unconstitutional, Judge Vinson addresses the Administration's fallback argument that the Constitution's Necessary and Proper Clause justifies the law even if the Commerce Clause doesn't. He writes that this clause "is not an independent source of federal power" and "would vitiate the enumerated powers principle." In other words, the clause can't justify inherently unconstitutional actions.



Judge Vinson also went beyond the Virginia case in striking down the entire ObamaCare statute—paradoxically, an act of judicial modesty. Democrats intentionally left out a "severability" clause if one part of the bill was struck down, and the Administration repeatedly argued that the individual mandate was "essential" to the bill's goals and mechanisms and compared it to "a finely crafted watch." Judge Vinson writes that picking and choosing among thousands of sections would be "tantamount to rewriting a statute in an attempt to salvage it."



***

We take a measure of vindication in the decision—David Rivkin and Lee Casey, the lawyers who argued the Florida case, first suggested in these pages that the individual mandate was unconstitutional. Judge Vinson's learned opinion has put down a Constitutional argument that will reverberate all the way to the Supreme Court.



This story has been corrected. An earlier version said that John Marshall was the first Chief Justice. He was the fourth.



Copyright 2011 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved

This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only.

The Un-Constitutionality Of ObamaCare In Black And White

From Pajamas Media and Vision to America:

The Unconstitutionality of ObamaCare in Black and White


Key excerpts from Judge Vinson's historic ruling.

January 31, 2011 - by Jeffrey H. Anderson Page 1 of 2 Next -> View as Single PageShare


United States District Court Judge Roger Vinson has ruled that ObamaCare’s individual mandate is unconstitutional and that, since removal of the mandate would make ObamaCare a fundamentally different act than the one that Congress passed, its removal must invalidate the entire 2,700-page overhaul.



In a case brought by 26 states arguing that ObamaCare is unconstitutional, Judge Vinson ruled that the individual mandate — ObamaCare’s requirement that every American must buy federally approved health insurance — exceeds the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, and is thereby unconstitutional.



Judge Vinson writes that “the defendants [the Obama administration’s Department of Health and Human Services, among others] have conceded that the Act’s health insurance reforms cannot survive without the individual mandate, which is extremely significant because the various insurance provisions, in turn, are the very heart of the Act itself.” Therefore, Vinson writes,



I must conclude that the individual mandate and the remaining provisions are all inextricably bound together in purpose and must stand or fall as a single unit.



This marks the first time that a federal judge has ruled that ObamaCare as a whole is invalid.



The judge took care to emphasize that “this case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care system.” Rather, he said, the case is about whether Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce also empowers it to compel commerce. Judge Vinson ruled that it does not, saying that to declare otherwise would extend the commerce power beyond the the plain and historically understood limits of that power and beyond the limits that the Supreme Court has previous sanctioned.



The Obama administration will now appeal the case, which was brought by Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.



Here are some key excerpts from Judge Vinson’s 78-page opinion:



[T]his case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care system. In fact, it is not really about our health care system at all. It is principally about our federalist system, and it raises very important issues regarding the Constitutional role of the federal government….



Never before has Congress required that everyone buy a product from a private company…just for being alive and residing in the United States….



It would be a radical departure from existing case law to hold that Congress can regulate inactivity under the Commerce Clause. If it has the power to compel an otherwise passive individual into a commercial transaction with a third party merely by asserting — as was done in the Act — that compelling the actual transaction is itself “commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce”…, it is not hyperbolizing to suggest that Congress could do almost anything it wanted. It is difficult to imagine that a nation which began, at least in part, as the result of opposition to a British mandate giving the East India Company a monopoly and imposing a nominal tax on all tea sold in America would have set out to create a government with the power to force people to buy tea in the first place….



I conclude that the individual mandate seeks to regulate economic inactivity, which is the very opposite of economic activity. And because activity is required under the Commerce Clause, the individual mandate exceeds Congress’ commerce power, as it is understood, defined, and applied in the existing Supreme Court case law….




The Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be utilized to “pass laws for the accomplishment of objects” that are not within Congress’ enumerated powers….



Having determined that the individual mandate exceeds Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, and cannot be saved by application of the Necessary and Proper Clause, the next question is whether it is severable from the remainder of the Act….



[T]here are two specific facts that are particularly telling in this respect.



First, the Act does not contain a “severability clause,” which is commonly included in legislation to provide that if any part or provision is held invalid, then the rest of the statute will not be affected….



The lack of a severability clause in this case is significant because one had been included in an earlier version of the Act, but it was removed in the bill that subsequently became law….



Moreover, the defendants have conceded that the Act’s health insurance reforms cannot survive without the individual mandate, which is extremely significant because the various insurance provisions, in turn, are the very heart of the Act itself. The health insurance reform provisions were cited repeatedly during the health care debate, and they were instrumental in passing the Act. In speech after speech President Obama emphasized that the legislative goal was “health insurance reform” and stressed how important it was that Congress fundamentally reform how health insurance companies do business, and “protect every American from the worst practices of the insurance industry.” See, for example, Remarks of President Obama, The State of the Union, delivered Jan. 27, 2009. Meanwhile, the Act’s supporters in the Senate and House similarly spoke repeatedly and often of the legislative efforts as being the means to comprehensively reform the health insurance industry….



In other words, the individual mandate is indisputably necessary to the Act’s insurance market reforms, which are, in turn, indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act….



I must [therefore] conclude that the individual mandate and the remaining provisions are all inextricably bound together in purpose and must stand or fall as a single unit. The individual mandate cannot be severed….



Because the individual mandate is unconstitutional and not severable, the entire Act must be declared void….


Jeffrey H. Anderson, an independent writer, was the senior speechwriter for Secretary Mike Leavitt at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.



ObamaCare Ruling Expected, Correct

From The CATO Institute:

Next: Health Care Ruling a Victory for Federalism and Individual Liberty


Previous: I Said Believe!

Obamacare Ruling Expected, Correct

Posted by Roger Pilon



Judge Vinson’s ruling today that Obamacare’s individual mandate is unconstitutional, following on the heels of Judge Hudson’s similar ruling in the Fourth Circuit, should give the new Congress all the confidence it needs to rescind this provision and more. Indeed, the idea that government could order a person to buy a product from a private vendor, or be fined for failing to do so, is so foreign to our Constitution for limited government that it’s a wonder that Congress ever imagined it had such a power to begin with.



The Congress that passed Obamacare is now gone. It will be an early test for members of the new Congress, including those many Senate Democrats up for reelection in 2012, whether they will study these well-reasoned opinions and come to a better understanding of the constitutional limits on their power. There are far better, more constitutional ways to enable Americans to obtain health care than through the massive government intrusion into the healthcare market that Obamacare ordered. There is nothing quite like a little freedom to enable Americans to solve their own problems.



Roger Pilon • January 31, 2011 @ 3:15 pm

Originalism, Precedent And Judicial Restraint

From ADF:

Legal Periodical: Originalism, Precedent, and Judicial Restraint








John O. McGinnis, Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism, Precedent, and Judicial Restraint, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 121 (Winter 2011)



Although originalism has grown in popularity in recent years, the theory continues to face major criticisms. One such criticism is that originalism cannot accommodate precedent. This criticism takes two forms. First, some critics, as well as some advocates of originalism, argue that originalism is inconsistent with precedent and therefore originalist judges must overturn all precedents that conflict with the Constitution’s original meaning. [FN1]



If these scholars are correct, however, originalism becomes far less attractive because it would obligate judges to make a number of radical and unpopular decisions. For example, depending on one’s reading of the Constitution’s original meaning, an originalist might be required to declare paper money unconstitutional or to reverse Brown v. Board of Education. [FN2] Second, even if originalists do follow precedent on pragmatic grounds, critics argue that this approach undermines originalism and its distinctive virtues. If judges can simply decide which precedents they want to follow, then originalism is little better than an unprincipled nonoriginalism.



This short Essay, which is based on a longer article, [FN3] responds to each of these precedent-based challenges to *122 originalism. First, we argue that there is no fundamental conflict between originalism and precedent. The original meaning of the Constitution allows for precedent because it treats precedent as a matter of federal common law that Congress can override by statute. [FN4]



Second, we argue that one can articulate a principled doctrine of precedent that is compatible with originalism and that preserves the most important benefits of both originalism and precedent. Our normative approach is consequentialist. A normatively desirable doctrine of precedent would follow precedent when the benefits of doing so are greater than the benefits of returning to the original meaning and would follow the original meaning in the reverse situation. [FN5]

Turning to this task, we begin by identifying the principal benefits of following the original meaning and the principal benefits of following precedent. [FN6] We then recommend a few precedent rules. [FN7] Our theory recommends an intermediate approach to precedent, sometimes following it and sometimes not. Although this theory is less respectful of precedent than the Supreme Court’s existing approach, [FN8] it would avoid the problems created by the wholesale rejection of nonoriginalist precedents while leaving a significant role for originalism in constitutional interpretation.



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Published Wednesday, February 2, 2011 6:44 AM



Are Originalist Constitutional theories Principled, Or Are They Rationalizations For Conservatism?

From ADF:

Legal Periodical: Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservativism








Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Are Originalist Constitutional Theories Principled, or Are They Rationalizations for Conservativism, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 5



My topic is whether originalism, and in particular the form of originalism that might be thought to constitute Originalism 2.0, is “a rationalization for conservatism, or a principled theory of interpretation.” [FN1] This question includes at least three parts: First, what is originalism? Second, are particular varieties of originalism capable of being, or likely to be, applied in a principled way? Third, are most or all varieties of originalism “rationalization[s] for conservatism”?

My answer to the first of these questions frames my answers to the second and third. Although it is customary to speak of originalism as a single constitutional theory, even a cursory review of recent scholarship reveals that the range of originalist theories has grown startlingly broad and diverse and is becoming more so all the time. [FN2] So great are the differences among originalist theories that I question the premise that we can talk meaningfully about Originalism 2.0 and whether it is a principled theory or a rationalization for conservatism. It would be more accurate to say that there are multitudinous rivals for the *6 title of Originalism 2.0 and that whether these competitors are principled can only be answered on a theory-by-theory basis.



When assessment proceeds accordingly, a striking feature of many originalists’ theories is their vagueness or indeterminacy. The vagueness of many originalist theories bears vitally on the second question, involving whether originalist theories are likely to be applied in a principled way. As a generalization, versions of originalism that are not well specified allow more opportunities for ideologically motivated manipulation to achieve conservative results than would more fully specified versions. By itself, this conclusion is hardly surprising. What may be less obvious is that originalist theories that are rigorously defined in advance, thus to avoid case-by-case inconsistencies in application, may be more prone to generate disturbing or even calamitous results than are originalist theories that leave more room for discretionary judgment. Originalists may therefore have good reason not to want to bind themselves too rigidly to a methodological mast.



With regard to the third question, however, the more methodological discretion that originalist theories authorize, and the more that practitioners of those theories exercise their discretionary judgment to justify substantively conservative conclusions, the better the charge that originalist theories are “rationalization[s] for conservatism” appears to fit. Suspicions of rationalization are also in order insofar as originalists maintain that the case for adopting an originalist theory is entirely independent of the theory’s conservative valence. [FN3]



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Published Wednesday, February 2, 2011 6:49 AM



Obama's Lawyers Preview New Push To Confirm Judges

From BKT and ADF:

February 01, 2011


Obama's Lawyer Previews New Push to Confirm Judges

Bauer_robert

In a rare public appearance, White House Counsel Robert Bauer pleaded today for senators to allow confirmation votes on more of President Barack Obama's judicial nominees.



Bauer, pictured above, spoke at an event organized by the liberal American Constitution Society and echoed what members of both parties have said for years, that the Senate confirmation process is broken. He said the Obama administration wants to move past debates about who’s at fault for delays and find a way to get nominees up-or-down votes.



“In this new Congress, we will continue to make the case for treating the confirmation of judges as the priority, the urgent priority, that it is. We will make this case from today until the end of this session and into the next,” Bauer said.



The administration has been ramping up its interest in judicial nominations in recent months, as hopes for moving major legislation through Congress have appeared to dim. The pace of nominations coming out of the White House has quickened, and Bauer’s speech was his first on the subject since he became the president’s chief lawyer 13 months ago.



In a panel discussion after Bauer’s speech, one Republican lawyer noted the shift. “I’m glad that the White House is finally making judicial nominations a priority,” said Makan Delrahim, a partner at Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck who’s a former chief counsel to Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) on the Senate Judiciary Committee.



Three_lawyers

Above, Bauer with White House Staff Secretary Lisa Brown, left, and Deputy Counsel Susan Davies



Bauer did not call for any changes to Senate rules, and he did not single out any nominees for attention. Instead, he described two dimensions of the slowed-down process. First, he said, many nominees sit “basically ignored” on the Senate’s calendar.



“No shouting on the floor. Just: nothing. It is as if...it does not matter at all,” he said. “It of course matters a great deal, to the nominees, to the courts to which they were nominated to serve and to the parties before those courts.”



Second, he said, senators can be vague in their discussions with the White House about why they oppose Obama’s choices both before and after the nominations have become public. “In my experience, these concerns, however strongly expressed, are all too often hard to really pin down,” Bauer said. “Sometimes it’s just a question of personal preference. The president has selected a candidate for nomination, and a particular member would have chosen differently.”



The way to move forward, he said, is to “re-examine” the process in a bipartisan way. He said senators should be able to agree on several principles, including that the pace of confirmations is not acceptable, that the president will consult with senators but may have “reasonable” differences and that each nominee should eventually receive a vote.



There are 101 vacancies on the district and circuit courts, according to the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.



Though Bauer did not highlight any nominees by name, one questioner in the audience did ask about the renomination of Goodwin Liu, for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and other picks who have been the biggest Republican targets. Bauer said he expects all to receive a vote. “We’re fully committed to them all. We will work the process very, very hard,” he said.



In response to a separate question, Bauer said the administration is unlikely to use the recess-appointment power for judicial nominees, in part because they would be temporary appointments. “Recess appointments are quite an inadequate response” to problems with the process, he said. (The Supreme Court has never ruled on whether such appointments are constitutional, as this report (PDF) explains.)



National Law Journal photos by Diego M. Radzinschi. Updated at 3:49 p.m. with the audience questions.



Posted by David Ingram on February 01, 2011 at 02:24 PM in Politics and Government
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